Michael Blome-Tillmann
Associate Professor &Â William Dawson Scholar
Michael Blome-Tillmann earned a BPhil (2003) and DPhil (2007) in Philosophy from the University of Oxford. Before joining the ÎÛÎÛ²ÝÝ®ÊÓƵ faculty in 2009 he was the Stevenson Junior Research Fellow in the Arts at University College, Oxford. More recently (2014-16) he was a Marie Curie Experienced Researcher at the University of Cambridge.
Blome-Tillmann's primary areas of research lie in epistemology, the philosophy of language, and especially their intersection (the semantics of knowledge attributions). He has published articles on a number of topics in epistemology, including scepticism, closure, Moorean reasoning, reliabilism, and epistemic contextualism, but also on topics in the philosophy of language. A monograph developing his views on epistemic contextualism has appeared in 2014 with Oxford University Press.
He enjoys discussing a wide variety of philosophical topics.
For more details on his current research please visit his .
Monographs:
- Knowledge and Presuppositions, Oxford University Press (2014).
Some Articles:
- Sensitivity Actually, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
- Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law, in: Thought 4/2 (2015), pp. 102-112.
- Ignorance, Presuppositions, and the Simple View, in: Mind 124/496 (2015), pp. 1221-1230.
- Counter Closure and Knowledge despite Falsehood, in: Philosophical Quarterly 64/257 (2014), pp. 552-568 (with Brian Ball).
- Solving the Moorean Puzzle, in: Philosophical Studies 172/2 (2015), pp. 493-514.
- Knowledge and Implicatures, in: Synthese 190/18 (2013), pp. 4293-4319.
- Indexical Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon, in: Erkenntnis 78/6 (2013, pp. 1317-1336 (with Brian Ball).
- Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms, in: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94/1 (2013), pp. 89–100.
- Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them), in: Philosophy Compass 8/2 (2013), pp. 170-185.
- Knowledge and Presuppositions, in: Mind 118/470 (2009), pp. 241-294.
- Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109/1 (2009), pp. 279-309.
- Contextualism, Safety and Epistemic Relevance, in: Philosophical Studies 143/3 (2009), pp. 383-394.
- Epistemic Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Interaction of 'Knowledge'-Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Embeddings, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79/2 (2009), pp. 315-331.
- Conversational Implicature and the Cancellability Test, in: Analysis 68/298 (2008), pp. 156-160.
- The Indexicality of 'Knowledge', in: Philosophical Studies 138/1 (2008), pp. 29-53.
- The Folly of Trying to Define Knowledge, in: Analysis 67/295 (2007), pp. 214-219.
- Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CVII (2007), pp. 387-394.
- A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CVI (2006), pp. 383-392.